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Abstract 
The shock on human capital caused by COVID-19 is likely to have long lasting consequences, 
especially for children of low-educated families. Applying a counterfactual exercise we project the 
effects of school closures and other lockdown policies on the intergenerational persistence of 
education in 17 Latin American countries. First, we retrieve detailed information on school 
lockdowns and on the policies enacted to support education from home in each country. Then, we 
use these information to estimate the potential impact of the pandemic on schooling, high school 
completion, and intergenerational associations. In addition, we account for educational disruptions 
related to household income shocks. Our findings show that, despite that mitigation policies were 
able to partly reduce instructional losses in some countries, the educational attainment of the most 
vulnerable could be seriously affected. In particular, the likelihood of children from low educated 
families to attain a secondary schooling degree could fall substantially. 
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This paper is concerned with the long-run effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
intergenerational persistence of inequality in Latin America. It focuses on one of the main drivers 
of these effects: namely, the closure of educational facilities established in most countries to limit 
the spread of the disease. Instructional time has a direct impact on students and its reduction has 
adverse effects on educational outcomes (Lavy, 2015). School closures that occurred in several 
circumstances, for instance during the 1916 polio pandemic and World War II, had negative effects 
on the educational attainment of affected children (e.g. Ichino and Winter-Ebmer, 2004; Meyers 
and Thomasson, 2017). Usually, disadvantaged children are particularly exposed during school 
closures and suffer major losses (e.g. Jaume and Willen, 2019; Alexander et al., 2008). This dynamic 
is further exacerbated by the economic shocks suffered by households during the COVID-19 
pandemic (see e.g. Adam-Prassl et al., 2020; Blundell et al., 2020; Chetty et al., 2020; Lustig et al, 
2020). School closures and lowered incomes are likely to decrease human capital investments for 
children living in poorer households in particular. These effects are likely to be irreversible and 
have negative consequences on earnings of the affected population throughout their lives (e.g. 
Almond, 2006). Depending on how pervasive and irreversible the impact of school closures on the 
entire population in school is, the negative impact of the pandemic on intergenerational inequality 
and equality of opportunity could be persistent and even last for several generations. The 
strengthening of the correlation between children and their parents’ education due to the 
“schooling shock” plays a major role in this process.  
Intergenerational associations of educational achievements are an insightful measure for the 
persistence between generations of the distribution of resources in a society, with a strong 
correlation between parents’ and children’s education pointing at low equality of opportunity 
(Hertz et al., 2007; Narayan et al., 2018; Neidhöfer et al., 2018). Hence, our aim is to estimate the 
potential long-lasting effects of COVID-19, simulating the extent to which the pandemic is 
intensifying the intergenerational persistence of education and deteriorating high school 
completion rates among individuals with different parental background. The impact on children’s 
human capital is quantified taking into account the amount of instructional time lost due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic (see e.g. Abadzi, 2009; Adda, 2016). We extend this approach to consider 
several variables that show considerable variation across Latin American countries: closure and 
reopening of educational facilities; online and offline interventions aimed at facilitating learning at 
home; the distribution of internet coverage among socio-economic groups; epidemiological 
parameters affecting the likelihood of infection and death of household members; household 
income losses; and, social assistance measures designed to mitigate the pandemic-related income 
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losses. Furthermore, our analysis takes into account that parents have different capabilities to 
substitute formal schooling. High-educated parents may be able to compensate the instructional 
loss fully, while children of low-educated parents mostly rely on the supply of schooling provided 
by the education systems (in class or through the support of home learning).   
Recent studies analyzed the impact of school closures on learning outcomes, either with surveys 
and real time data (e.g. Angrist et al., 2020; Aucejo et al., 2020; Chetty et al., 2020), standardized 
test scores (e.g. Engzell et al., 2021; Maldonado and De Witte, 2020), or simulating the potential 
aggregate impact (e.g. Azevedo et al., 2020; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2020; Jang and Yum, 2020) 
and its consequences for long-run earnings and welfare (e.g. Fuchs-Schündeln et al., 2020; 
Psacharopoulos et al., 2020). In all current analyses, the heterogeneity in the learning losses 
experienced by students of different socioeconomic background due to COVID-19 is largely 
documented. Aucejo et al. (2020) find that lower-income students in the US are 55% more likely 
than their higher-income peers to have delayed graduation in higher education. Andrew et al. (2020) 
shows that in the UK during the school lockdown primary and secondary school children from 
households in the highest income quintile learned around 1.5 and 1 hour more at home, respectively, 
than their peers from the poorer income quintiles. Bacher-Hicks et al. (2020) show that in the US 
internet searches for online learning resources are disproportionately high in geographic areas with 
higher average income and better internet access. The findings of Chetty et al. (2020) about the 
learning progress recorded on an online math platform during the school lockdown confirm this 
picture as well: while children in high income areas recovered quickly to the pre-crisis levels, 
children in lower-income areas remained persistently under the baseline level. Test score data for 
Belgium and the Netherlands shows increasing patterns in inequality within and between schools, 
and stronger learning losses in schools with a larger share of disadvantaged students from less-
educated households (Engzell et al., 2021; Maldonado and De Witte, 2020). To the best of our 
knowledge, none of them investigated changes in intergenerational associations due to COVID-19 
or differences across countries regarding education policies during the lockdown. 
Our study estimates the impact of the pandemic on the accumulation and allocation of human 
capital, and projects, for the first time to the best of our knowledge, its consequences for 
intergenerational persistence of education and equality of educational opportunities in Latin 
America, one of the most affected regions worldwide in terms of COVID-19 deaths and economic 
costs (IMF, 2020; ECLAC, 2020). In November 2020, around eight months after the beginning of 
the pandemic, 97% of children in the region were still out of classrooms (UNICEF, 2020). Acevedo 
et al. (2020) estimate that due to the situation educational exclusion in the region could increase by 
15%. To estimate the effects on intergenerational persistence, we proceed in three steps. First, 
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using data on parents and children’s education from Latinobarometro, a representative survey 
including 18 Latin American countries, and the standard methods to measure intergenerational 
persistence, we estimate the slope coefficient, correlation coefficient, and rank correlation for the 
most recent pre-pandemic cohort available (i.e. individuals born between 1987 and 1994) extending 
the analysis of Neidhöfer et al. (2018).1 Second, taking into account school closures and eventual 
re-openings, several indicators of offline and online learning, as well as other relevant characteristics, 
we simulate the heterogeneous impact by family background of COVID-19 school closures and 
other shocks on school achievements of these individuals. This step generates a counterfactual 
scenario. Third, we proceed to re-estimate the slope coefficient, correlation coefficient, and rank 
correlation for the counterfactual “post-pandemic” scenario. Additionally, we estimate the high-
school completion rates for children of low- and high-educated parents for the observed and the 
counterfactual scenario and proceed to compare the two. 
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to quantify and compare the long-term 
implications of the pandemic on educational attainment and intergenerational mobility in a unified 
framework for a large set of countries. Our findings show that, despite that educational mitigation 
policies were able to partly reduce learning losses in some countries, the pandemic puts at risk the 
educational attainments of the most vulnerable and equality of opportunity. The likelihood of 
children from low educated families to complete high-school could fall by 20 percentage points or 
more, reversing decades of progress made in Latin America in terms of access to education among 
children from disadvantaged households, and the average slope coefficient of intergenerational 
education persistence could rise by 7% from a regional average of 0.36 to 0.39.   
2 Counterfactual Estimation Exercise 
2.1 Intergenerational persistence 
Human capital investments may be affected by demand- and supply-side factors that limit or 
enhance the investment opportunities of families. The COVID-19 pandemic affects both. School 
closures affect supply, and falling household incomes and illness affect demand for education. 
Assuming a human capital production function where the primary production factors are schooling 
and the family, the main component that drives the uneven shock of the pandemic, and its 
intergenerational persistence, is the learning loss suffered by children.  
                                                 
1 Intergenerational mobility estimates from Neidhöfer et al. (2018) are available on http://mobilitylatam.website . 
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An established way to display the process of intergenerational persistence is through the following 
equation: 
𝑌0 = 𝛽𝑌−1 + . (1) 
Here, 𝑌 is a measure of human capital or socioeconomic status, for instance education measured 
in years of schooling, for two subsequent generations within a family.  is the error term. Hence, 
it is implied that the process of intergenerational persistence is autoregressive of the first order and 
the slope coefficient 𝛽 measures the velocity of regression to the population mean (Becker and 
Tomes, 1979; 1986). 𝛽  is also the parameter that shows the persistence of advantages and 
disadvantages transmitted from parents to children. It can be empirically estimated through a linear 
regression of children’s outcomes on the characteristics of their parents. Higher values of 𝛽 
indicate a higher level of association between parents’ and children’s outcomes (for example their 
educational attainments) and, thus, lower equality of opportunity (see Hertz et al., 2008). For 
instance, using years of schooling as outcome measure, a value for 𝛽 of 0.5 says that an advantage 
of one year of schooling of one family over other families in the same generation is associated with 
a transmission of half of this advantage to the next generation. A 𝛽 equal to 1 means that there is 
no churning of the advantages, i.e. there is zero mobility over time, and a 𝛽 equal to zero means 
that children’s educational attainments are independent of the attainment of their parents, i.e. there 
is perfect mobility. 
Our aim is to quantify the potential effect of school closures and lockdown measures caused by 
the COVID-19 pandemic on the intergenerational association of education in Latin America. For 
this purpose, we first estimate 𝛽 for the years of schooling of the cohort of young individuals that 
already left the education system in pre-COVID-19 times but is closest to the cohort of children 
that are now in the education system. Then, we simulate the shock of the pandemic on the human 
capital of these individuals to obtain a counterfactual measure of their predicted years of schooling. 
Finally, we re-estimate the intergenerational persistence on this simulated counterfactual outcome 
and compare the estimated parameters.2 The exercise reveals how the intergenerational persistence 
of this cohort would have changed if these individuals had suffered a human capital loss equivalent 
to the one potentially caused in 2020 by COVID-19.  
                                                 
2 In our main application, we estimate the slope coefficient 𝛽. To test the robustness of our results, we also estimate 
the correlation coefficient and rank correlation. Performing the exercise with either of these measures yields 
qualitatively the same results. Hence, we report only the estimates of the slope coefficient in the main text and the 
other two measures in the Supplemental Material. 
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To provide a further, more intuitive measure of educational persistence and absolute upward 
mobility, we estimate the probability of individuals with different parental educational background 
to achieve a certain level of education. Following Neidhöfer et al. (2018) we predict the average 
probability of individuals with low and high-educated parents to achieve at least a secondary 
education degree. For comparability across countries and cohorts, we define the two types of 
parental education as follows: low parental education, i.e. less than a secondary education degree; 
and high parental education, i.e. at least secondary education. Again, these measures are estimated 
with the actual education of individuals as reported in the data, as well as after the counterfactual 
simulation of the COVID-19-shock. 
2.2 Post-pandemic human capital 
The main driver of the human capital shock suffered by children due to the COVID-19 pandemic 
has been the closure of schools aimed at limiting the spread of the disease. Several studies have 
shown that reduced instructional time lowers academic achievement (e.g. Jaume and Willen, 2019). 
As evidenced by studies measuring the educational gaps after summer vacations, it is likely that this 
situation mostly affects children from disadvantaged backgrounds (e.g. Alexander et al., 2007). 
These children have fewer educational opportunities beyond school, while their parents are less 
prepared to support them in the educational process at home. Furthermore, the capabilities of 
families to facilitate learning from home are uneven. They depend on the abilities of parents, their 
acknowledgement of the value of education for lifetime outcomes, the available educational tools 
and resources, and the availability of computers and internet coverage. Most parents with higher 
education can help their children with learning from home. They might be able to replace teachers 
and possibly even improve their children’s skills due to the one–to-one interaction. 3  Hence, 
children living in low-educated families have clear disadvantages. Indeed, real time data on learning 
during the COVID-19 pandemic confirms this disproportion in educational efforts, outcomes, and 
expectations between poor and rich families (e.g. Aucejo et al., 2020; Bacher-Hicks et al., 2020; 
Chetty et al., 2020; Engzell et al., 2021; Maldonado and De Witte, 2020). However, the impact of 
school closures on children’s human capital also depends on the effort done by the countries to 
provide online and offline home learning resources. Hence, in our exercise to simulate the 
educational loss caused by the pandemic we take into account all of these aspects: school closures, 
educational mitigation strategies, and the ability of parents to replace formal schooling in 
educational facilities. 
                                                 
3 Evidence for very young children shows that spending most of the time with their high skilled parents, rather than 
in childcare, significantly increases their cognitive abilities in the long run (Fort et al., 2019). 
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Our simulation exercise builds on measuring the amount of instructional time lost due to the 
closure of schools (see e.g. Abadzi, 2009; Adda, 2016). Conceptually, education is translated into 
an equivalent measure of human capital, where one year of schooling corresponds to an increase 
in human capital by one unit. Hence, the instructional time lost due the pandemic, measured as 
share of the regular school year, is taken into account as human capital loss and subtracted from 
the years of schooling of the individual. What results is a counterfactual measure of the individual’s 
educational attainments if she would have suffered the loss of instructional time caused by the 
pandemic. We extend the approach to take into account impacts on individuals in different 
countries and taking into account their parents’ level of education. Hereby, we choose the 
assumptions of the model as conservative as possible, such that the resulting human capital loss 
should constitute a lower bound of the potential deficit.4 For instance, we assume that in periods 
of school closures students do not forget what they had learned before, despite that this might be 
the case as shown for the summer vacation period (e.g. Cooper et al., 1996). Later, in Section 4.6, 
we discuss the caveats and potential limitations of this approach and their implications for the 
interpretation of our results.  
The conceptual basis of the exercise is a human capital production function defined by three 
components: schooling, family environment, and innate abilities (e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann, 
2012). We assume innate abilities not to be affected by the pandemic and concentrate on the role 
played by schooling and family factors. The post-pandemic counterfactual education 𝑒𝑖𝑗?̂?  of 
individual 𝑖 living in country 𝑐  whose parents have level of education 𝑗 is defined as her actually 
measured education 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑐 from which the 𝜅 share of the year of school lost due to COVID-19 is 
subtracted.  
𝑒𝑖𝑗?̂? = 𝑒𝑖𝑗𝑐 − 𝜅𝑖𝑗𝑐 (2) 
Conceptually, equation (2) measures how strong the pandemic-related shock reduces the education 
of the individual; ranging from zero, i.e. the education of the individual is not affected at all by the 
pandemic, to one, which stands for an entire year of schooling lost. This reduction varies by country 
and parental educational background.  
                                                 
4 This aspect is challenged by the potential existence of differential age- or grade-effects and discussed in Section 4.6. 
It particularly applies to the estimates of the slope, correlation and rank correlation coefficients that consider the entire 
distribution of years of education. Instead, changes in the likelihood of high-school completion are driven by 
individuals at the margin (those that completed secondary education but did not follow up with tertiary education) and, 
hence, not directly affected by this potential problem. Therefore, in case of the likelihood of high-school completion 
by parental background we can more safely assume our estimates to constitute a lower bound. Furthermore, we 
perform robustness checks to account for grade-effects. 
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𝜅 has two interacting components, which are directly retrieved from the theoretical framework of 
the human capital production function described before:  
𝜅𝑖𝑗𝑐 = 𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑐 ⋅ 𝛼𝑖𝑗 (3) 
𝐾  is the share of instructional time lost and 𝛼  stands for one minus the parental factor of 
substitution. Both parameters can range from zero to one. 𝐾 = 0 means schools remain open for 
the entire year or mitigation strategies are able to substitute in-person classes perfectly, while 𝐾 =
1  means schools are closed for the entire year and no educational mitigation strategies are enacted. 
𝛼 = 0  corresponds to the case in which all parents of educational background 𝑗  are able to 
perfectly replace in-school attendance and 𝛼 = 1 to the case in which not a single parent of 
educational background 𝑗 is able to do it. We will first describe the calculation of 𝐾 and below the 
one of 𝛼.  
𝐾 includes the days lost due to school closures and is compensated by the effort of countries to 
support the education of children when not at school, as well as structural characteristics of the 
country’s internet connectivity and digital infrastructure that have been proven useful to learn from 
home. Furthermore, it encompasses the health risk suffered by the individual and her family due 
to the spread and mortality rate of COVID-19 in the country of residence. To set these parameters, 
we draw from various data sources. Formally, 𝐾 is: 
𝐾𝑖𝑗𝑐 =
𝑡𝑐 (1 − 𝑓𝑐 ⋅ 𝛿 − 𝑛𝑐 ⋅ 𝑃(𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑐 = 1) ⋅ (1 − 𝛿)) + 𝜏𝑖𝑐
𝑇𝑐
. (4) 
Here, 𝑡 is the amount of days of school lost from the closure of schools to the day of reopening, 
subtracting the country-varying days of school vacation lying in between, and 𝑇 the amount of 
school days in a regular year of schooling.5 The term enclosed in the first parenthesis measures the 
compensation of schooling facilitated by public investments in home learning tools. 𝑓 and 𝑛 are 
indices that we construct to capture the extensiveness of offline and online education tools during 
the pandemic.6 𝛿 is a weight between the two set of resources that defines their relative effectivity. 
                                                 
5 For those countries where schools have not been reopened yet the date is set to the beginning of November 2020. 
6 Governments made different efforts for children to keep on studying during the pandemic. Mainly, they gave out 
printed copies, sent educational material via cellphone, and broadcasted educational contents through radio and TV. 
The index 𝑓 was calculated as the share of tools used among the four mentioned. On top of these efforts governments 
also provided resources for online learning. Using information on digital platforms, virtual tutoring, digital resources, 
and digital content repositories we constructed the index 𝑛, which captures the use of these tools by the country’s 
educational system. 𝑓 (𝑛) is one if all the offline (online) educational tools were used by the country’s education system 
during the school closure, and zero if none of them was used. For all other combinations the indexes lie between these 
values. More detailed information on these measures and the sources of information are included in the Supplemental 
Material (Table S3). 
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In the main analysis we set this weight to 0.5, meaning that ceteris paribus both offline and online 
learning resources are equally capable to transmit learning material and may together be able to 
replace a regular day in class. The index of online education is further interacted with the probability 
of the individual to have access to internet 𝐴, which we approximate by the internet coverage 
among people in socioeconomic group 𝑗 in the country. While for all individuals the school closure 
is compensated by the offline learning resources provided by their country’s education system, the 
𝐴𝑗𝑐 share of individuals whose parents have education level 𝑗 in country 𝑐 are assumed to have 
access to internet and, hence, to online learning resources, as well. This step of the analysis enters 
the simulation as follows: First, we estimate the distribution of internet coverage based on 
household surveys for each country (the methodology is explained in Table S3 in the Supplemental 
Material). Then, we randomly draw from our sample the 𝐴 share of individuals whose parents have 
education level 𝑗 in country 𝑐. Finally, for these individuals, we subtract from the total days of 
schooling lost (𝑡𝑐 − 𝑡𝑐𝑓𝑐𝛿) the days compensated with online learning resources (𝑛𝑐(1 − 𝛿) ⋅ 𝑡𝑐), 
while for the remaining (1 − 𝐴) share of the population within group 𝑗 the instructional loss is 
only compensated by offline learning.  
𝜏 captures the instructional loss due to health shocks suffered by households (see e.g. Aucejo et al., 
2020). It includes two components: 
𝜏𝑖𝑐 = 𝜏
𝑞 ⋅ 𝑃(𝑞𝑖𝑐 = 1) + 𝜏
𝑑 ⋅ 𝑃(𝑑𝑖𝑐 = 1) . (5) 
𝑞 is the infection of one of the household members with COVID-19 and 𝑑 death due to the latter. 
To estimate the probabilities of these events to occur, the number of COVID-19 infections and 
deaths per inhabitant in the country is multiplied by the average country-level household size. 𝜏𝑞 
and 𝜏𝑑 are the respective amounts of days of schooling lost due to the occurrence of the two events, 
either due to the time the child has to stay at home in case someone in the household is infected, 
or due to a reduction of home learning caused by the overall burden associated to infection, illness 
or even death of a family member. We set 𝜏𝑞 to the average days of symptom duration, which has 
been found to be around one week (i.e. five days of schooling), and 𝜏𝑑 to a three week loss of 
instructional time (i.e. 15 days).7 Again, these losses are attributed randomly to the within-group 
share of the sample that mirrors the probability of infection and death in the family.  
                                                 
7 It has been shown that death of a parent might cause serious educational losses and even school dropout (e.g. Case 
and Ardington, 2006; Gertler et al., 2004). However, since the likelihood of death due to COVID-19 rises with age 
and existing medical preconditions, we mainly assume older household members to be affected rather than parents of 
younger children and adolescents, and choose a shorter instructional loss due to the death of a household member. 




The parental factor of substitution captures the capabilities of parents to substitute formal 
schooling. Through equation (3) it defines the strength in which the educational loss defined by 𝐾 
is suffered by children, depending on the circumstances they face in terms of parental background. 
We define 𝛼, which is one minus the parental factor of substitution, as 








 are the completed years of schooling of parents with educational degree 𝑗. The range of years 
of schooling goes hereby from zero years, equivalent to illiterate parents, to 15 for parents with 
completed tertiary education. Consequently, the extreme values of 𝛼 are zero for high educated 
parents that may fully substitute the educational losses, and one for children of illiterate parents 
who completely absorb the educational shock caused by the pandemic. For other levels of parental 
education the value of 𝛼 lies within this interval. Note that 𝛼 may be the actual capacity of parents 
to help their children with the learning material, or more broadly the informational advantage about 
the value of education for lifetime success and the connected investments to support it, such as 
parental time,  the availability of technological devices at home, private schooling, and tutoring. 
Generally, 𝛼 captures the higher propensity of parents with higher education and socio-economic 
status to invest in their children’s education (see e.g. Heckman and Mosso, 2014). Since 𝛼  is 
interacted with the whole term 𝐾 in equation (3) this interaction eventually defines the strength of 
the individual loss in instructional time due to school closure, taking also into account the 
differential exposure to health risks for households of different socio-economic status during the 
COVID-19 pandemic (see e.g. Blundell et al., 2020). 
Although our calibration of the parental factor of substitution does not directly derive from current 
empirical estimates of the effect of school closures on learning losses by parental socioeconomic 
background, it meets the overall pattern observed in empirical studies. For instance, Jaume and 
Willen (2019) find that the negative effect of teacher strikes on educational outcomes in Argentina 
was strong for children of low-educated parents and mostly zero for parents with high education. 
Maldonado and De Witte (2020) show that after the school closures caused by the COVID-19 
pandemic in Belgium the learning losses were high in schools where most children have low 
educated mothers and nil in schools with a high share of high-educated mothers. Engzell et al. 
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(2021) find a substantial difference in the test score gap between children of high and low-educated 
parents caused by the school closure in the Netherlands.8 
The parameter 𝛼 can be understood in either of the two following ways: as the proportional loss 
of 𝐾 experienced universally by all children of parents with a 𝑗 level of education, or as a certain 
share of children of parents with a 𝑗 level of education who lose the entire 𝐾 proportion of the 
school year, while the rest lose none. We call the first scenario concentrated losses and the latter dispersed 
losses.9 Conceptually, in the dispersed scenario 𝛼 is the degree in which all parents with educational 
degree 𝑗 are able to substitute schooling, while in the concentrated scenario, it is the likelihood of 
parents with educational degree 𝑗 to be a perfect substitute of schooling. While in the former the 
shock is distributed to the degree 𝛼 ⋅ 𝐾  evenly to all individuals with the respective parental 
background, the latter attributes a shock of the amount of 𝐾 to a randomly selected 𝛼-share of the 
population within those groups; i.e. 𝛼𝑖𝑗  = 𝛼𝑗 for all 𝑖 with parental education 𝑗 in the dispersed 
scenario, and 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 1  with probability 𝛼𝑗  and 𝛼𝑖𝑗 = 0  with probability (1 − 𝛼𝑗)  in the 
concentrated scenario. For example, for children whose parents complete primary education only, 
we assumed 𝛼 =  1 −  0.33 (parental factor of substitution = 5/15). In the dispersed scenario, 
this means that all the children whose parents completed only primary school lose 2/3 times 𝐾 of 
the school year. In the concentrated scenario, this should be interpreted that 2/3 of the children in 
this group lose the entire 𝐾 amount of the year, while the remaining 1/3 the children in this group 
complete the year normally.  
We report the simulated concentrated educational losses in the main body of the text and the 
dispersed losses in Figure S2 in the Supplemental Material. Note that the slope coefficient of the 
regression is going to be very similar for either scenario because the average loss for each group 
where parents have a 𝑗 level of education is almost the same in both cases.10 In other words, the 
                                                 
8 The fact that Engzell et al. (2021) find a significant negative effect also for children of high educated parents depends 
on the broad definition of this category that mirrors the classification used by the Dutch Ministry of Education to 
determine school funding, namely “at least one parent with a degree above lower secondary education”. Indeed, our 
calibration allows an educational gap to exist for children of parents whose level of education is below a completed 
tertiary degree. 
9 This distinction mimics the existence of two scenarios of dispersed and concentrated losses contemplated, for instance, 
in Lustig et al. (2020), in considering the effects of COVID-19 on incomes. 
10 When one does not consider the likelihood of internet access, of infection, and death in the analysis – which in both 
simulated scenarios, the dispersed and the concentrated one, are modelled as probabilities and randomly attributed to 
the 𝐴, 𝑞 𝑜𝑟 𝑑 share of individuals with parental education 𝑗 in country 𝑐 – the expected value of 𝜅𝑖𝑗𝑐 , as well as average 
years of education, are equivalent in both scenarios. This applies also to the special case that these probabilities are 
zero or one for all 𝑖 with parental education 𝑗. For each probability between zero and one the expected relative 
instructional loss 𝜅 in the dispersed scenario is defined by the interaction between the value of 𝛼, the probability to 
have access to internet, and the probability of infection and death in the household. In the concentrated scenario 
12 
 
coefficient is insensitive to something that is important: the dispersion within the losers. That is 
why it is crucial to assess the impact on an indicator which is sensitive such as the high school 
completion rate.11 We will discuss the drawbacks and limitations of this additional measure of 
educational persistence when describing the results in Section 4.2 and verify the consistency of the 
measure to changing the main assumptions of the model with robustness checks in Section 4.6. 
3 Data 
The micro-data we use to perform the simulations and estimate the potential effects of the 
estimated instructional loss on schooling and intergenerational persistence of education derives 
from Latinobarometro, a representative survey including 18 Latin American countries. 12 
Latinobarometro is particularly suitable for a multi-country analysis of intergenerational persistence 
of education because it includes detailed and harmonized information about the education of 
individuals and retrospective information about the education of their parent with the highest 
educational degree (see Neidhöfer, 2019). Estimates of educational attainment and its distribution 
deriving from Latinobarometro are highly comparable to estimates obtained with national 
household surveys (Neidhöfer et al., 2018). We use the survey waves from 1998 to 2017 and restrict 
the sample to individuals born between 1987 and 1994 who were at least 23 years old when 
responding to the survey. While the age limit ensures that the individuals should have completed 
their education when responding to the survey, we select the cohort 1987-1994 to warrant that our 
simulations in terms of mobility are as close as possible to the potential mobility of the cohort of 
children and youth currently in school in 2020. The further back we would go, the weaker would 
this assumption be, given that the region has experienced a remarkable level of educational 
upgrading. Our final sample comprises 10,524 individuals evenly distributed across countries. 
To reduce measurement error, rather than using the information on actual years of schooling 
included in the survey for both individuals and their parents, we impute the regular years of 
education associated with the respective educational degree.13 In what follows, we report our 
                                                 
instead, it is defined by the conditional probability of all events to occur simultaneously. For instance, to suffer an 
instructional loss with probability 1 − 𝛼𝑗 and to have no access to internet with probability 1 − 𝐴𝑗𝑐 . 
11 The rank correlation in this case is sensitive too, but with a mechanical component: the rank correlation will be lower 
in the concentrated losses case, because the fact that all individuals with parental education 𝑗 loose the same amount 
of the school year leaves the number of ranks unchanged. Conversely, if only some loose, while others do not, the 
number of ranks is higher than in the status quo. 
12 In this analysis, we include all Latin American countries included in the survey with the exemption of Nicaragua 
because the country never officially closed schools during the pandemic. Generally, there have been concerns about 
the overall handling of the pandemic in Nicaragua (see Mather et al., 2020, and subsequent replies on this article). 
13 In the main analysis, years of schooling are imputed based on the following scheme (in parenthesis the imputed years 
of schooling): Illiterate (0), incomplete primary (3), complete primary (5), incomplete secondary (8), complete 
secondary (12), incomplete tertiary (13), complete tertiary (15). We perform robustness checks replacing the values for 
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estimates obtained by weighting for the inverse probability of selection, normalizing the weights 
over the different survey waves, and without inclusion of control variables. Estimates obtained 
controlling for sex and survey year fixed effects differ only slightly and not significantly.   
To compute the single components of 𝐾 , we retrieve the information on school closures, 
educational policies, and other structural characteristics of the countries from different sources 
including national education ministries, international organizations, and macro data sources (see 
Table S3 in the Supplemental Material). 
4 Results 
4.1 Instructional loss due to school lockdowns 
Using the procedure described in Section 2.2, we simulate the instructional loss for each individual 
in each country and socioeconomic group 𝑗. Table 1 shows the values of all variables used to 
compute 𝐾 for each Latin American country. A detailed explanation on how all these variables are 
computed and the underlying sources can be found in Table S3 in the Supplemental Material. Table 
2 shows the values of 𝜅, resulting from the interaction between schooling features, captured by 𝐾 
and 𝛼. The loss in instructional time associated to these values can be interpreted as the average 
share of the school year lost by individuals in the respective socio-economic group.  
We observe that, while for individuals in the higher parental background classes (at least completed 
secondary education) the instructional loss is rather low, namely lower than or close to 10% in all 
countries, substantial differences between countries exist among individuals with low educational 
background. Bolivia, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, and Peru are the countries with the highest 
average estimated instructional losses, around 60% of the school year; while in Ecuador, 
Dominican Republic, and Uruguay the lowest educational impact is recorded. These differences 
depend in part on the reopening of schools, but are also clearly marked by the effort of education 
systems to provide alternative learning tools and the pre-existent digital infrastructure to provide 
access to online resources. The health risk associated with COVID-19 only marginally contributes 
to the instructional loss.  
                                                 
incomplete degrees with the country-specific modal years of schooling in the respective educational categories and 
find no significant differences to the main estimates. 
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4.2 Secondary education completion 
Although the simulation framework that we develop mainly works through changes in the years of 
schooling and their distribution, for illustrational purposes we also focus on secondary education 
completion. First, to offer a further intuitive baseline result about the potential impact of the 
pandemic on educational attainment and inequality. Second, because of the particular policy 
relevance of this specific cutoff. Increasing secondary school completion rates are an indicator of 
the educational expansions that characterized Latin America for the past decades (Levy and Schady, 
2013). Especially children from low-educated families benefited from this expansions, leading to a 
substantial decrease of intergenerational persistence over time (Neidhöfer et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, changes in inequality in the region have been associated with changes in returns just 
above and below high school completion (Lopez-Calva and Lustig, 2010).  
Figure 1 shows the overall share of individuals who attain a secondary educational degree (i.e. attain 
at least 12 years of schooling) in the sample for each country before and after consideration of the 
COVID-19 shock, using the estimates for the instructional loss reported in Table 2. The share for 
the regular school year is estimated using the actual years of schooling of the individuals, while the 
second bar shows the estimate using the counterfactual adjusted years of schooling instead, i.e. 𝑒𝑖𝑗?̂? 
from equation (2). On average, the likelihood to complete secondary education in Latin America 
drops from 56% to 42%. There is, however, quite a bit of variation across countries. The country 
with the sharpest decline is Brazil, where we observe a decrease of 23 percentage points. The one 
with the lowest decline is Uruguay with a 6 percentage point decrease. While the generally lower 
pre-pandemic baseline high school completion rate in Uruguay in comparison to Brazil surely 
explains part of this difference, it is also remarkable that Uruguay is one of the countries in our 
sample with the lowest projected average instructional loss across socioeconomic levels (see Table 
2). Particularly, Uruguay stands out because of the shorter duration of the school closure, as well 
as the availability of online resources to mitigate learning losses (see Table 1). 
In Figure 2 we report the likelihood to complete a secondary education degree for individuals with 
low and highly educated parents (corresponding to parents with and without a completed 
secondary school). This likelihood is estimated by the predicted probability to attain 12 or more 
years of schooling. 14  Again, this likelihood is estimated for the baseline scenario and after 
simulation of the COVID-19 shock, i.e. after subtraction of 𝜅𝑗𝑐 . Altogether, these results highlight 
                                                 
14 Indeed, studies confirm that absence in school leads to significant negative effects on achievements, which could 
eventually lead to school dropout (e.g. Kubitschek et al., 2005). However, we also relax this assumption taking into 
account that moderate instructional losses might be recovered and that education systems might allow for extensions 
to complete the school year. The results of these additional applications is discussed in Section 4.6. 
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the heterogeneous impact of the pandemic on educational attainment associated to parental 
background. While the likelihood of individuals from high-educated families to complete high 
school is hardly affected, this same likelihood for individuals with low-educated parents is 
considerably lower in the post-pandemic scenario with respect to the baseline. On average, the 
likelihood of completing high school for children of low-educated families declines by almost 20 
percentage points.15 Again, the sharpest decline is recorded in Brazil (32 percentage points) and the 
lowest in Uruguay (9 percentage points). In Guatemala in Honduras the probability of secondary 
school completion of individuals from low-educated families even falls under 10%. We also 
estimate high-school completion rates by parental background for men and women separately and 
find similar patterns among both groups. Results are reported in Figure S4 in the Supplemental 
Material. 
The differences we find in the impact of the pandemic on the high-school completion rates of 
individuals with low- and high-educated parents depend on the distribution of education just 
around the cut-off (i.e. secondary school completion, which is equivalent to twelve years of 
schooling). Indeed, changes to high school completion rates in this part of the exercise respond to 
changes at the extensive margin (i.e. the share of children loosing at least one day of schooling due 
to the pandemic) rather than to changes at the intensive margin (i.e. the amount of days of 
schooling lost due to the pandemic). Since the impact of the pandemic on this measure of 
educational persistence is driven by individuals who completed secondary schooling and not more, 
what is crucial for the results is tertiary education enrollment. While most children of high-educated 
parents continue their educational career spending at least some years in tertiary education, many 
children of low-educated families that experience educational upward mobility attain at most a 
secondary degree, and hence fall under the threshold of 12 years of schooling after simulation of 
the COVID-shock.16 
                                                 
15 We choose completed secondary education as threshold to define high and low-educated parents mainly to warrant 
comparability with past educational mobility estimates (e.g. Neidhöfer et al., 2018). Although we observe ample cross-
country heterogeneity, in Latin America parents with at least a completed secondary degree constitute about the top 
33% of the distribution, while in all countries this group is larger than 10% (see Table S4 in the Supplemental Material). 
If we define high-educated parents as parents with at least completed primary school, and low-educated parents as 
parents with an educational level below that threshold, the average decline in the likelihood of secondary school 
completion of children from low-educated families in Latin America is almost the same. Figure S6 in the Supplemental 
Material shows the estimated likelihoods applying this alternative threshold. 
16 On average for the 1987-94 cohort in Latin America, 37% of individuals with low-educated parents and a completed 
secondary degree continue their educational career afterwards (less than 16% of all individuals with low-educated 
parents have at least some years of tertiary education). Among children of high-educated parents, this statistic is 65% 
(53% of all individuals with high-educated parents). See also the transition matrix in Table S5 and, for a complete 
picture for each country, Table S6 in the Supplemental Material. 
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Figure 3 shows the trend in the average degree of absolute educational upward mobility (i.e. the 
likelihood of secondary school completion for individuals whose parents did not complete high 
school) for the region, including a projection for the cohorts closest to high school completion in 
2020, namely the 2001-2005 birth cohort.17 This cohort is the oldest one directly affected by the 
COVID-19 crisis while at the same time these children are potentially enrolled in the education 
system and close to high school graduation. We report the expected degree of educational upward 
mobility of this cohort with and without the impact of the COVID-19 shock (i.e. a decrease of the 
likelihood by 20 percentage points due to the pandemic as shown by our simulation exercise). As 
can be seen in the Figure such a decrease in high school graduation rates of disadvantaged children 
would bring the region several decades back. The resulting rather low average degree of educational 
upward mobility was lastly reported in Latin America for cohorts born in the 1960s (see also 
Neidhöfer et al., 2018). 
4.3 Effect on intergenerational persistence 
Figure 4 shows the estimated degree of intergenerational persistence of the sample – measured by 
the slope coefficient – for the baseline (i.e. reported years of education) and after simulation of the 
counterfactual background specific learning loss due to the pandemic (see Tables 1 and 2), as well 
as their difference. A hypothetical worst case scenario is included as further benchmark in the graph. 
The worst-case scenario computes the learning loss assuming that schools remain closed for an 
entire year and no mitigation strategies to reduce the learning loss are enacted; i.e. 𝐾 = 1.18  
We observe that, although the enacted policies prove effective to reduce the potential learning loss 
due to school closures, intergenerational persistence rises in all countries. The slope coefficient in 
the post-pandemic counterfactual is, on average for all Latin American countries, around 7% higher 
than the baseline. To put this figure into context, between 1940 and 1990 – a period marked by 
upward educational mobility – the slope coefficient for Latin America, measured as an average over 
all countries, declined by 4% from one four-year birth cohort to the next (own calculations based 
on the estimates provided in Neidhöfer et al., 2018). In other words, the loss in intergenerational 
mobility could be significant. The strongest differences are observed in Peru (0.39 vs. 0.43), Mexico 
(0.30 vs. 0.34), and Bolivia (0.40 vs. 0.44), and the weakest differences in Honduras (0.56 vs. 0.57), 
the country with the highest slope coefficient in the baseline. 
                                                 
17 The likelihood of the two youngest cohorts, for which data is not available yet, has been obtained by linear 
extrapolation of the series from 1941 to 1995. 
18 Table A1 shows the estimated differences and their corresponding standard errors. Table S1 in the Supplemental 
Material shows the corresponding values and the difference between the actually measured degree of persistence and 
the counterfactual scenarios.  
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4.4 Extension: Drop-out due to household income loss 
We extend the exercise to account for additional shocks that might affect human capital 
investments among families. Hence, this part of the exercise takes into account changes in demand 
side factors that affect the education of children and interact with the factors mainly related to the 
supply of education analyzed so far. As has been shown, parental job loss and household income 
shocks may cause educational drop out (see e.g. Duryea et al., 2007; Cerutti et al., 2019; Thomas et 
al., 2004). However, if the income shock depends on an economic crisis, declining opportunity 
costs of leaving school to enter the labor force may also lead to higher educational enrollment (e.g. 
Ferreira and Schady, 2009; Torche, 2010). Hence, the resulting overall effect on educational 
attainment is ambiguous and may vary by family background characteristics. To take into account 
that the likelihood of drop out may depend on parental socioeconomic background we perform 
the exercise setting the probability of educational drop out, defined by a loss of an entire year of 
schooling, to 𝛼. This estimate yields an upper bound of the effect of income loss on education, 
especially at the bottom of the distribution. This upper bound is useful to evaluate the qualitative 
significance deriving from the additional impact of household income shocks, on top of the effects 
studied in the sections before. The new counterfactual measure of years of schooling is 
𝑒𝑖𝑗?̃? = 𝑒𝑖𝑗?̂? − 𝛼𝑗 ⋅ 𝐷𝑗𝑐 (7) 
where 𝑒𝑖𝑗?̂? are the counterfactual years of schooling defined in equation (2), 𝛼 the inverse of the 
parental factor of substitution from equation (6), and 𝐷𝑗𝑐  the probability of parents with 
educational background 𝑗 in country 𝑐 to suffer an important income shock due to the pandemic. 
To estimate these probabilities, we rely on the data and microsimulation exercise adopted in Lustig 
et al. (2020) to Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. We define 𝐷𝑗𝑐 as a loss of more than 50% 
of income, and simulate the probability of households to lose this amount of income due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic for each level of education of the household head. The simulated 
probabilities for two scenarios, namely with and without inclusion of the economic mitigation 
strategies enacted by the countries to cushion income losses, are shown in Table S2 in the 
Supplemental Material. 19  The strongest income losses are registered in the middle of the 
distribution, where the greatest proportion of household income is at risk, and lower at the top and 
at the bottom. 
Figure 5 shows the resulting changes in intergenerational persistence and educational upward 
mobility. Besides of the already reported increase in persistence related to school closures and 
                                                 
19 For an exact description of the economic mitigation strategies enacted by countries, as well as the methodology and 
data sources to obtain these estimates, see Lustig et al. (2020). 
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health risks, we observe a small additional increase as a consequence of parental job loss. This 
increase is absorbed, in part but not entirely, by the enacted mitigation strategies. The same picture 
emerges analyzing the likelihood of individuals with low parental background to attain a secondary 
schooling degree. In this case, for all countries but Argentina the additional (quite small) impact of 
parental job loss on the probability to drop out from school is not compensated by the enacted 
economic mitigation strategies.20  
In conclusion, this extension of the exercise highlights that the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on education and intergenerational persistence is mainly driven by the closure of schools, the 
cushioning effect of educational mitigation strategies, and infrastructural characteristics, as the 
distribution of internet coverage among the population. These results confirm the findings of 
Füchs-Schündeln et al. (2020) whose model predicts that the negative impact of the COVID-19 
shock on children’s long-run welfare is driven by school closures, while the income shocks suffered 
by households during this crisis play a secondary role. Policies mainly supporting the demand for 
education with cash transfers, which result to be effective to improve education of vulnerable 
children in regular times (e.g. Fiszbein and Schady, 2009; Molina Millan et al., 2019; Neidhöfer and 
Nino-Zarazua, 2019), are hardly effective in a context of closed educational facilities. 
4.5 Mitigation through online learning 
The adoption and further diffusion of educational technologies and online learning tools has been 
both employed and exhaustively discussed as a measure to reduce instructional losses during the 
COVID-19 pandemic (e.g. Clark et al., 2020). Our aim in this last part of the exercise is to evaluate 
whether improved online learning in the context of Latin American countries may reduce the 
unequal effect of school closures and support equality of opportunity. Figure 6 shows the 
correlation between the country-level extensiveness of online learning and overall internet coverage 
with predicted average instructional losses during the pandemic.21 On a first sight there seems to 
be a positive association. Hence, we analyze if major dedication and concentration to online 
learning tools can close the learning gap.  
We simulate an increase in the extensiveness of online learning tools to the maximum; i.e. we set 
𝑛 = 1 in equation (4) which means that the quality of online learning is such to substitute in-class 
                                                 
20 As shown by Ciaschi (2020) while the probability of school dropout of male children raises due to parental job loss, 
the probability of female children might be not affected. To simplify the exercise, we do not condition on gender. 
However, because of the low additional effect of parental job loss beyond supply side factors related to school closures, 
we do not expect this to significantly affect our estimates. 




schooling perfectly. Furthermore, we fix the dedication of the educational effort in times of school 
closures at 100% to online tools; i.e.  𝛿 = 0 in equation (4).  
Figure 7 shows, in the upper graph, the estimated likelihood of children from low educated 
background to complete secondary education in the scenario with improved online learning, and 
compares it to the two other scenarios discussed in Section 4.2. We observe that, despite improving 
online learning increases secondary school completion rates, it is not enough to close the gap 
caused by the pandemic. Indeed, in countries with very low internet coverage among lower 
socioeconomic groups the change in completion rates is almost non-existent. The lower graph in 
Figure 7 shows the implications of this for intergenerational persistence: For countries with very 
unequal internet coverage, a complete concentration on online education and its contemporaneous 
improvement would cause even higher educational persistence. Hence, although possibly more 
cost-effective and efficient than the production of offline education tools, relying completely on 
online learning in times of school closures is not equalizing. In contrast, given the current 
distribution of access to internet in many Latin American countries it might even increase 
educational inequality. This should be even exacerbated by the lower availability of computers and 
other digital devices among poor households, which we are not taking into account in this analysis. 
Important and targeted investments in digital infrastructure and internet connectivity are necessary 
for online learning to equalize the playing field. Alternatively, recent evidence shows that low-
technology interventions such as SMS and direct phone calls can be effective in reducing learning 
gaps in a context of developing countries (Angrist et al., 2020). 
4.6 Robustness and Limitations 
To test the robustness of our results we relax two of the main assumptions of the model. First, as 
mentioned before, we perform a sensitivity analysis to estimate the impact of the pandemic in a 
scenario of dispersed, rather than concentrated, learning losses (see Figure S2 in the Supplemental 
Material). In this application, secondary school completion is substantially lower. In almost all 
countries the predicted probability of low background children to complete secondary education 
reaches even levels close or above 20%. The results of this additional robustness check can be 
regarded as an upper bound estimate of the negative effect of the COVID-19 crisis. 
Secondly, we relax the assumption that 12 full years of education are necessary to complete a 
secondary school degree. Albeit absence in school due to individual reasons indeed leads to 
significant negative effects on achievements, a moderate instructional loss shared by many students 
in the same school may not cause the same dramatic and unrecoverable educational loss (e.g. 
Kubitschek et al., 2005). Furthermore, in case of moderate instructional losses the education 
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systems in certain countries might enable extensions for pupils to complete the school year (see 
e.g. UNESCO et al., 2020). Therefore, we estimate the likelihoods of secondary school completion 
setting different thresholds for the post-pandemic counterfactual: 11.75 and 11.5 years. These 
applications provide a more conservative estimate than the strict threshold of 12 years of schooling. 
In these cases, the assumption is that children will complete secondary education despite of the 
pandemic if their reported education in absence of the shock is a completed secondary degree or 
higher, and the suffered instructional loss is not higher than 25% or 50% of the school year. We 
observe that in these applications the gap in the completion of secondary schooling with respect 
to the regular year without COVID-19 is lower, and in few countries it may even vanish. However, 
even in the less stringent threshold level there are still remarkable differences with respect to the 
baseline in 11 of the 17 countries in the region. These results are shown in Figure S3 in the 
Supplemental Material. 
Still, our analysis has some caveats behind the intrinsic assumptions of the counterfactual exercise. 
First, we assume that individuals do not suffer a cumulative effect due to the learning loss, possibly 
leading to earlier educational drop out, but continue their educational trajectories as soon as regular 
schooling is re-established. Second, we do not directly consider the additional effect of school 
closures, and other situations connected to the pandemic, on externalities and other features, such 
as nutrition, obesity, mental health, teenage pregnancy, non-cognitive skills etc (Wang et al., 2020). 
Surely, these other factors are crucial for human development, and shocks in these dimensions may 
decrease the upward mobility of vulnerable children as well (see e.g. Ferreira and Schady, 2009; 
Almond et al., 2018). However, considering these aspects would clearly contribute to even stronger 
learning losses causing our current estimates to be a lower bound.  
Third, in our evaluation the effects of the instructional loss are assumed to be the same for all ages 
and in all school grades or, equivalently, that all individuals in the sample are hit at the same age 
(or in the same grade). Conversely, the direction of the bias deriving from this assumption is a 
priori not clear. Possibly, it may be easier to make up for instructional losses in earlier grades, while 
harder later on, when the learning material is more intense. At the same time, older children might 
be more able to study on their own and depend less on their parents. Indeed, recent analyses of 
the long-term effects of school closures caused by COVID-19 come to contrasting conclusions: 
while the model by Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2020) predicts that younger children are hurt more, 
Jang and Yum (2020) find that school closures reduce intergenerational mobility especially among 
older children. Anyway, especially for children from disadvantaged background it is unlikely that 
age-related effects offset the entire impact of school closures, especially since changes in the 
likelihood of high-school completion are driven by individuals at the margin (those that completed 
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secondary education but did not follow up with tertiary education). However, the issue could apply 
particularly to the estimates of the slope, correlation and rank correlation coefficients that consider 
the entire distribution of years of education. Under consideration of potential age-related effects 
our estimates for these measures of persistence would constitute an upper rather than a lower 
bound of the effect of COVID-19. Hence, we perform robustness checks to account for grade-
effects in the estimation of the slope, correlation and rank correlation coefficient. First, we assume 
that the effect for those with less than secondary education is nil (hence assuming that at earlier 
ages the instructional loss can be recovered, or that the pandemic shock hit in a year when these 
individuals already left the education system). Then, we estimate the reverse, namely that only those 
with secondary or more are affected by the instructional loss (which is similar to the scenario 
analyzed by the likelihood of high-school completion). In both cases the difference in coefficients 
between the baseline and the post-pandemic counterfactual are lower than in the main analysis (5% 
and 3%, respectively), but still sizeable in most of the countries.22 
Fourth, our analysis exploits the variation in education policies across countries. Yet, what could 
also affect differences in instruction time reduction across children from different socio-economic 
backgrounds is a potentially differential implementation of policies across schools and districts, 
leading to (spatial) variation within countries. Insofar as these differential implementations are 
correlated with parental background, for instance because of differences between private and 
public schools or residential segregation, their effect is captured by the parental factor of 
substitution. Other sources of (geographical) heterogeneity in learning losses are a very interesting 
subject for future investigations. 
Lastly, our simulations only encompass the human capital shock due to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
while assuming all other years to be regular and corresponding to a unitary increase in human 
capital. While this assumption is standard in the literature on the intergenerational persistence of 
education, we acknowledge that, particularly in developing countries, accumulated years of 
education of individuals are mostly a rather imprecise measure of their human capital (Hanushek 
and Woesmann, 2008; Filmer et al., 2020). Furthermore, structural characteristics of the educational 
systems and macroeconomic crises generate regularly a reduction in instructional time and a great 
amount of variance in the quality of educational institutions (Abadzi, 2009). To corroborate these 
findings, measuring the learning gap caused by COVID-19 with standardized test scores or similar 
qualitative measures as soon as the data is available, remains a very important issue. 
                                                 
22 Interestingly, in Guatemala and Honduras, where high-school completion rates are very low among children with 
low-educated parents, the first robustness check (setting out the effect for those with less than completed secondary 




School closures and other lockdown policies seem to have been able to reduce the mortality 
associated to COVID-19 in most countries (e.g. Dehning et al., 2020; Flaxman et al., 2020). On the 
other hand, they caused disruptions with potentially significant and serious long-run consequences. 
In this paper, we quantify one dimension of these disruptions. Namely, the effect of the pandemic 
on inequality in educational attainment, and intergenerational persistence. Our projections show 
that the COVID-19 pandemic puts at risk the educational attainments of disadvantaged individuals 
and may cause a substantial decrease in intergenerational mobility. For instance, our estimates show 
that the average slope coefficient of intergenerational education persistence could rise by 7% from 
a regional average of 0.36 to 0.39. This number is significant, especially since in Latin America on 
average from 1940 to 1990 the slope coefficient has been decreasing by 4% from one four-year 
birth cohort to the next, respectively. Furthermore, high school completion rates of children with 
low-educated parents in Latin America could fall by 20 percentage points reversing decades of 
progress made by the region in terms of educational upward mobility.  
Of course, our estimates do not take into account that future interventions may compensate for 
the learning losses in the near future. The desire for this to happen is, indeed, the main motivation 
for our analysis. We believe that strong measures to compensate education losses and risks for 
vulnerable children should be the priority at this point. Our projections show that without targeted 
policy measures, financial efforts, and political will to support education, the future of several 
generations of young Latin Americans is at serious danger. To avoid the irreversible destruction of 
the human capital of poor children and youth is a necessity and will define the shape of the society 
we will live in tomorrow. 
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Table 1 – Indicators used to compute the instructional loss 
 Schooling Connectivity among socioeconomic groups by the education of the household head COVID-19 (09/20)  





Avg. hh size 
ARG 154 180 0.75 0.69 0.63 0.67 0.69 0.72 0.78 0.81 0.01090 0.00023 3.3 
BOL 157 200 0.50 0.25 0.12 0.28 0.26 0.44 0.76 1.00 0.01062 0.00062 3.5 
BRA 157 200 0.50 0.63 0.49 0.59 0.68 0.84 0.91 0.92 0.01972 0.00060 3.3 
CHL 154 190 0.75 0.75 0.68 0.67 0.77 0.84 0.90 0.92 0.02245 0.00062 3.6 
COL 150 200 0.75 0.75 0.32 0.48 0.66 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.01350 0.00043 3.5 
CRI 154 200 0.50 0.50 0.66 0.73 0.76 0.77 0.79 0.79 0.00989 0.00011 3.5 
DOM 72 197 0.25 0.44 0.67 0.74 0.77 0.78 0.80 0.80 0.00932 0.00018 3.5 
ECU 100 200 0.75 0.56 0.29 0.44 0.51 0.69 0.85 0.99 0.00637 0.00061 3.8 
SLV 158 200 0.50 0.38 0.14 0.25 0.31 0.55 0.96 1.00 0.00411 0.00012 4.1 
GTM 145 180 0.75 0.56 0.31 0.47 0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00448 0.00016 4.8 
HND 162 200 1.00 0.56 0.13 0.24 0.29 0.51 0.90 0.94 0.00669 0.00021 3.9 
MEX 136 185 0.25 0.50 0.33 0.48 0.65 0.93 1.00 1.00 0.00504 0.00054 3.7 
PAN 163 185 0.50 0.38 0.30 0.44 0.51 0.69 0.86 1.00 0.02317 0.00050 3.7 
PRY 158 200 0.75 0.38 0.28 0.45 0.68 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00344 0.00007 4.6 
PER 154 185 0.50 0.69 0.15 0.27 0.37 0.61 0.87 1.00 0.02141 0.00093 3.8 
URY 75 180 0.25 1.00 0.46 0.55 0.70 0.82 0.90 1.00 0.00049 0.00001 2.8 
VEN 121 180 0.25 0.33 0.63 0.66 0.69 0.72 0.78 0.80 0.00191 0.00002 3.3 
Notes: t are the days of instructional lost (assuming schools reopen in November 2020 if they are still closed), T the days in a regular year of schooling, f and n indices 
that measure the alternative supply of education during school closures through offline (TV, radio, cellphone, printed copies) and online (internet) learning provided by 
the education system. Reported COVID-19 cases and deaths per inhabitant recorded in September 2020. Sources: see Table S3 in the Supplemental Material.
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ARG 0.35 0.28 0.23 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.00 
BOL 0.58 0.46 0.37 0.26 0.11 0.07 0.00 
BRA 0.47 0.38 0.30 0.20 0.08 0.05 0.00 
CHL 0.30 0.24 0.20 0.13 0.05 0.03 0.00 
COL 0.38 0.30 0.22 0.13 0.04 0.03 0.00 
CRI 0.45 0.36 0.29 0.20 0.09 0.06 0.00 
DOM 0.27 0.21 0.17 0.12 0.05 0.03 0.00 
ECU 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.00 
SLV 0.57 0.46 0.37 0.26 0.10 0.06 0.00 
GTM 0.43 0.35 0.27 0.16 0.06 0.04 0.00 
HND 0.38 0.30 0.23 0.16 0.06 0.03 0.00 
MEX 0.58 0.47 0.37 0.24 0.09 0.06 0.00 
PAN 0.61 0.49 0.39 0.27 0.11 0.07 0.00 
PRY 0.45 0.36 0.29 0.18 0.07 0.05 0.00 
PER 0.58 0.47 0.37 0.24 0.09 0.05 0.00 
URY 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.10 0.04 0.02 0.00 
VEN 0.52 0.41 0.34 0.24 0.10 0.07 0.00 
Notes: Numbers indicate the average share of the year of schooling lost due to COVID-19 for each socio-
economic group j (by parental educational background). Source: Own estimates based on various sources; 
see Table 1 and Table S3 in the Supplemental Material.  
  
Figure 1 – Weighted share of individuals in sample who complete secondary education 
before and after imputation of the COVID-19 shock on human capital. 
 
Notes: Completed secondary education is equivalent to 12 full years of schooling. First scenario shows 
actual share of individuals in sample with completed secondary schooling. Second scenario shows estimates 
of the same share after simulation of the COVID-19 shock. Source: Latinobarometro, own estimates.  
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Figure 2 – Estimated likelihood to complete secondary education by socioeconomic 
background before and after imputation of the COVID-19 shock. 
 
Notes: Bars show the likelihood to complete at least 12 years of schooling before and after simulation of 
the COVID-19 shock on education. High educated parents have at least completed secondary education, 




Figure 3 – Updated trend in educational upward mobility. 
 
Notes: Dots show the likelihood of children whose parents have less than secondary education to complete 




Figure 4 – Intergenerational persistence of education in Latin America before and after 
imputation of the COVID-19 shock on human capital. 
 
 
Notes: Worst case scenario shows an instructional loss equivalent to 100% of the school year without any 





Figure 5 – Intergenerational persistence of education accounting for the additional effect 
of household income losses due to the pandemic. 
 
 
Notes: First counterfactual scenario takes into account the instructional loss due to school closures and 
health shocks caused by COVID-19. Two additional counterfactual scenarios account for the likelihood of 
educational drop out due to household income losses caused by the pandemics: firstly, without considering 
economic mitigation strategies; secondly, considering the cushioning effect of economic mitigation 




Figure 6 – Online learning, internet coverage and average instructional loss. 
 
 
Notes: Graph shows the relationship between the average difference in intergenerational persistence at the 
bottom of the distribution (between the situation without COVID-19 and the post-pandemic counterfactual) 
and online learning. Online learning index computed based on distinct information, see Supplemental 




Figure 7 – Simulated effect of improved online learning on intergenerational persistence. 
 
 
Notes: Simulated raise in the extensiveness of online learning tools to the maximum; i.e. n=1 in equation 
(4) which means that the quality of online learning is such to substitute in-class schooling perfectly. Here, 
we fix the dedication of the educational effort in times of school closures at 100% to online tools; i.e. δ=0 
in equation (4). Source: Latinobarometro, own estimates. 
APPENDIX 
Table A 1 – Estimates and standard errors 
 Average years of education Slope coefficient Absolute upward mobility Top persistence 
 Regular w/COVID -∆% Regular w/COVID Diff. s.e. Regular w/COVID Diff. s.e. Regular w/COVID Diff. s.e. 
Argentina 10.89 10.81 0.7 0.362 0.386 -0.024 0.002 0.499 0.329 0.170 0.018 0.861 0.813 0.047 0.012 
Bolivia 10.26 10.11 1.5 0.400 0.435 -0.036 0.001 0.525 0.287 0.239 0.018 0.946 0.916 0.030 0.012 
Brazil 10.37 10.27 1.0 0.272 0.303 -0.031 0.002 0.610 0.294 0.316 0.026 0.863 0.787 0.076 0.019 
Chile 10.90 10.83 0.7 0.349 0.372 -0.023 0.007 0.500 0.257 0.243 0.055 0.824 0.765 0.059 0.015 
Colombia 10.40 10.29 1.1 0.494 0.523 -0.029 0.001 0.407 0.272 0.135 0.013 0.874 0.847 0.027 0.008 
Costa Rica 8.76 8.61 1.7 0.316 0.342 -0.025 0.002 0.347 0.187 0.160 0.019 0.669 0.655 0.014 0.010 
Dominican Rep. 8.87 8.82 0.6 0.273 0.287 -0.014 0.001 0.456 0.220 0.236 0.021 0.715 0.646 0.068 0.019 
Ecuador 11.39 11.35 0.3 0.318 0.336 -0.018 0.001 0.661 0.472 0.189 0.019 0.936 0.901 0.035 0.011 
El Salvador 6.66 6.42 3.7 0.414 0.441 -0.027 0.002 0.276 0.116 0.160 0.020 0.568 0.558 0.010 0.010 
Guatemala 5.59 5.39 3.5 0.480 0.496 -0.016 0.002 0.191 0.074 0.117 0.016 0.629 0.548 0.080 0.040 
Honduras 5.38 5.22 3.1 0.560 0.570 -0.010 0.002 0.156 0.046 0.111 0.014 0.618 0.530 0.088 0.034 
Mexico 10.37 10.23 1.4 0.302 0.339 -0.037 0.001 0.531 0.265 0.266 0.026 0.870 0.823 0.048 0.014 
Panama 10.07 9.96 1.1 0.327 0.360 -0.033 0.002 0.487 0.250 0.237 0.025 0.764 0.720 0.044 0.016 
Paraguay 8.17 7.97 2.3 0.394 0.427 -0.033 0.002 0.429 0.200 0.230 0.020 0.813 0.724 0.089 0.030 
Peru 11.19 11.10 0.8 0.389 0.426 -0.038 0.001 0.567 0.291 0.276 0.027 0.906 0.885 0.021 0.007 
Uruguay 9.56 9.47 1.0 0.356 0.375 -0.019 0.002 0.299 0.212 0.087 0.015 0.601 0.588 0.013 0.009 
Venezuela 11.76 11.70 0.5 0.181 0.215 -0.034 0.002 0.679 0.380 0.299 0.028 0.875 0.848 0.027 0.008 
Notes: Table shows average years of education and intergenerational mobility estimates for the cohort 1987-1994. ‘Regular’ shows the actually measured level of 
intergenerational persistence. w/COVID shows the post-pandemic counterfactual after simulation of the COVID-19 shock. Diff. shows the difference between the 
regular school year and the counterfactual, and s.e. its corresponding bootstrapped standard error obtained with 100 replications. -∆% shows the years of schooling 
decrease in percentage points. Slope coefficient is the coefficient of a linear regression of children’s years of education on the years of education of their parents. Absolute 
upward mobility is the likelihood of children with low-educated parents to complete high school. Top persistence is the same likelihood for children with high-educated 
parents. Source: Latinobarometro, own estimates. 
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